We show that the axiomatization given by Levesque for his logic of \only knowing" (Levesque 1990), which he showed to be sound and complete for the unquanti ed version of the logic and conjectured to be complete for the full logic, is in fact incomplete.
1 Introduction Levesque (1990) introduced a rst-order modal logic OL with a modal operator for \only knowing", which was taken to be the conjunction of \knowing at least" and \knowing at most". 1 He provided a collection of axioms for this logic which he showed were sound and complete in the unquanti ed case. He conjectured that the axiomatization was complete for the full logic. As we show here, it is not.
In the next section of this note we review the syntax and semantics of OL, and Levesque's axiomatization of it. In Section 3, we show that Levesque's axiomatization is incomplete. We conclude in Section 4 with some further discussion of the problem of axiomatizing OL.
A review of OL
We brie y review enough of OL here to make this paper self-contained. The reader is encouraged to consult (Levesque 1990 ) for further details and intuition. This paper is essentially identical to one that appears in Arti cial Intelligence 74:2, 1995, pp. 381{387. Although we have used the word \knowledge" here, we actually allow the agent's knowledge to be false, so that \belief" may be more appropriate. Since the distinction between knowledge and belief is irrelevant in this paper, following Levesque we use the words \knowledge" and \belief" interchangeably in this paper to denote belief.
The non-modal part of OL consists of a standard rst-order logic with = and a countably in nite set of standard names, which are treated syntactically like constants, but have a special semantics (see below). There are neither regular constants nor function symbols. This base language is extended by two modal operators, B and N, where B can be read as \the agent believes (at least) " and N can be read as \the agent believes at most that is false." O is taken to be an abbreviation of L ^N: . An atomic formula is a predicate other than = applied to standard names. The formula x=n] denotes with all occurrences of the free variable x replaced by n. A formula is said to be basic if it does not involve the N (or O) operator, objective if it does not involve any modal operators, and subjective if all predicate symbols occur within the scope of a modal operator.
The semantics is based on the notion of possible worlds, where a world is an interpretation of the predicate symbols over the domain consisting of the standard names. Thus, the standard names are rigid designators, denoting the same element of the domain, namely themselves, in every world. A world w can be identi ed with the set of atomic formulas that are true at w (using the standard semantics of rst-order logic). We call the set of all worlds W 0 . Belief (B) is modeled in a standard possible-world fashion in terms of a set W of worlds. Actually, the semantics we have just described is not quite Levesque's semantics. Rather than allowing W to be an arbitrary set of worlds, Levesque requires that W be maximal in a sense we now describe.
Two sets of worlds are said to be equivalent if they represent the same set of basic beliefs.
More precisely, we say that sets W and W 0 are equivalent if for every basic formula , we have W j = B i W 0 j = B . Levesque shows that there is a unique way to extend each set of worlds to a largest set which is equivalent to it. These largest sets of worlds are called maximal sets.
For technical reasons, Levesque uses only maximal sets in his semantics for OL. Thus, Levesque de nes a formula to be valid if W; w j = for all situations such that W is maximal.
We also use Levesque's version of validity, but notice that his de nitions make perfect sense even if we do not restrict to maximal sets. We de ne a formula to be strongly valid if W; w j = for all situations W; w (including ones where W is non-maximal). Clearly a formula that is strongly valid must be valid. It follows immediately from the de nition of maximality that validity and strong validity coincide if we restrict to basic formulas. On the other hand, there may be non-basic formulas that are valid but not strongly valid.
We next review Levesque's axiomatization.
The axiom system AX Let L stand for both B and N.
Axioms: A1: All instances of theorems of rst-order logic. A2: L , where is an instance of a theorem of rst-order logic. A3: (n i = n i )^(n i 6 = n j ), where n i and n j are distinct standard names. A4: and one not in . Levesque showed that AX is sound with respect to his notion of validity, where only maximal sets of worlds are considered, and complete with respect to unquanti ed sentences, so that any valid sentence without quanti ers is provable from these axioms. It is easy to see that AX is also sound with respect to strong validity, where we allow arbitrary sets of worlds.
Incompleteness of the axiom system
In this section we prove that Levesque's axiom system is incomplete with respect to the full language. In fact, we show that there is a formula that is strongly valid that is not provable in his system. Consider the two sets W 1 and W 2 de ned in the proof of Theorem 3.6 of (Levesque 1990) . W 1 consists of all worlds in which at least the odd-numbered standard names satisfy P, and let W 2 = W 1 ? fw 0 g, where w 0 is the world where the standard names that satisfy P are precisely the odd-numbered standard names. It is easy to check that the only standard names believed to satisfy P in both W 1 and W 2 are the odd-numbered names, that is, W j j = B(P(n i )) i i is odd, for j = 1; 2.
Levesque shows Lemma 3.1: (Levesque 1990 Lemma 3.3: Everything provable from AX is strongly valid with respect to j = NS . Proof: We must check that all the axioms of AX are strongly valid with respect to j = NS and that all the rules of inference preserve strong validity with respect to j = NS . The result then follows by a straightforward induction on the length of the proof. All the cases are completely straightforward except possibly the axiom A7. Since j = and j = NS agree on all sets of worlds except possibly W 2 , we must only check what that this axiom holds in W 2 .
Suppose that for some falsi able objective formula , we have W 2 j = NS N ^B . By Lemma 3.2, we have that W 1 j = NS N . Since j = NS and j = agree with respect to W 1 , we must have W 1 j = N . Since j = NS and j = agree with respect to formulas of the form B where is objective, we must also have W 2 j = B . By Lemma 3.1, we have W 1 j = B . Thus, W 1 j = B ^N . But this contradicts the strong validity of axiom A7 with respect to j =.
Our goal is now to construct a formula that is strongly valid with respect to j = but not with respect to j = NS . By Lemma 3.3, such a formula cannot be provable from AX, thus showing that AX is incomplete.
Let 1 be the sentence 9x(P(x)^:BP(x)) and let 2 be the sentence 9x(:P(x)^BP(x)). 2 Thus, 1 is true if there is a standard name satisfying P that is not one of the standard names believed to satisfy P; 2 is true if there is a standard name satisfying :P which is one of the standard names believed to satisfy P. Let = 1 _ 2 . Notice that is true at every world with respect to W 1 or W 2 except w 0 , the world where the standard names that satisfy P are precisely those believed to satisfy P. Thus, W i ; w j = for i = 1; 2, unless w = w 0 .
(1)
Since does not mention N, it is easy to see that (1) also holds if we replace j = by j = NS .
2 These sentences were used (for a di erent purpose) in (Levesque 1984) .
Lemma 3.4: N ) :B is strongly valid (with respect to j =).
Proof: Suppose W j = N . Let A = fn : n is a standard name and W j = BP(n)g and let w be a world such that w j = P(n) i n 2 A. It is easy to see that W; w j = : . Since W j = N , it must be the case that w 2 W. Thus, W j = :B . This proves the strong validity of N ) :B .
(Notice that this does not follow from axiom A7, since is not an objective formula, although the proof of its validity follows along the same general lines as the corresponding proof for objective formulas.)
The following lemma shows that, although it is valid with respect to j =, N ) :B is not valid with respect to j = NS :
Lemma 3.5: W 2 j = NS N ^B .
Proof: This follows from observation (1) above, which says that is satis ed (with respect to j = or j = NS ) by every world except w 0 . However, we do not consider w 0 for either B (since w 0 = 2 W 2 ) or N (because of our nonstandard semantics). Thus, there is a formula that is strongly valid (with respect to j =) that is not provable, namely N ) B . We conclude, as desired, that: Theorem 3.6: AX is not a complete axiomatization for OL.
Discussion
Having shown that Levesque's axiomatization is incomplete, the question remains what a complete axiomatization would look like.
Typically, we expect an axiomatization to be recursive. As Levesque already noted, his axiom system is not recursive. In particular, A7 is not recursive, since it involves checking whether a formula is rst-order formula is falsi able, which is known to be a co-r.e. problem (see (Rogers 1967) ). This is not an artifact of Levesque's framework. It is easy to show that there cannot be a recursive complete axiomatization of OL, since the validity problem for the language is not r.e. Lemma 4.1: Every complete axiomatization of OL is non-recursive. Proof: Suppose there were a recursive complete axiomatization AX 0 of OL. Then the set of falsi able objective formulas would be r.e., since we could generate them by generating all the objective formulas such that N ) :B is provable from AX 0 . Since the set of falsi able objective formulas is co-r.e., this is a contradiction.
If we are willing give up recursiveness, then nding a non-recursive axiomatization is, in a sense, trivial: simply declare every valid sentence an axiom. Of course, for an axiomatization to be instructive, it should not have to appeal to the very notion which it tries to capture. We would hope that the axioms would be \natural", and give insight into the logic.
We do not know whether there is a \natural" proof-theoretic account of the logic (whatever that may mean), but, as the following results suggest, if there is one, it will be hard to nd.
Recall that our incompleteness proof proceeds by showing that, for a particular basic formula , the formula N ) :B is strongly valid yet not provable from the axioms. The latter formula almost looks like an instance of axiom A7. It is not, of course, since A7 would apply only if the formula were objective. The obvious idea, namely to strengthen axiom schema A7 by allowing it to range over all falsi able basic sentences, can easily be dismissed. For example, consider the subjective sentence BP(n) for some predicate P and standard name n. BP(n) is obviously falsi able, yet NBP(n) ) :BBP(n) is not valid. In fact, NBP(n) BBP(n) is easily derivable from the axioms (using A6) and is therefore valid. But what about basic sentences that are not subjective like the sentence used in the previous section? In other words, do we obtain a complete axiomatization if we replace axiom A7 by the following axiom A7 0 ? A7 0 : N ) :B , if is a falsi able basic non-subjective sentence.
Since is basic, non-subjective, and falsi able, the o ending sentence N ) :B would now come out trivially as a theorem. Unfortunately, A7 0 does not solve the problem either, since restricting the axiom schema to non-subjective basic sentences is still unsound. To see this, consider the formula ' = 8x(P(x) ) BP(x)); which is obviously falsi able. However, Lemma 4.2: N' ) :B' is not valid. Proof: Let W P consist of all worlds w such that w j = 8xP(x). Clearly W P is maximal. For suppose W and W P are equivalent. Then, in particular, W j = B(8x(P(x)), so we must have W W P . We next show that W P j = B'^N'. It is easy to see that W P ; w j = B(8xP(x)) ) ' for all worlds w. Since W P j = B(8xP(x)), it follows that W P ; w j = ' for all worlds w. This means that W P j = B'^N'. Hence N' ) :B' is not valid (and, a fortiori, not strongly valid).
Although, as we just showed, N' ) :B' is not valid, there is a sense in which it just misses being valid. As we now show, the only time it fails to be valid is when every standard name is known not to satisfy P (as was the case for the set W P of worlds considered in Lemma 4.2). Lemma 4.3: :B(8xP(x)) ) (N' ) :B') is strongly valid. Proof: Let W be any set of worlds such that Wj =:B(8xP(x))^N'. Since Wj =:B(8xP(x)), there is a standard name n such that Wj =:BP(n ). Since Wj =N', it follows that for all w 0 = 2 W, we have W; w 0 j =8x(P(x) ) BP(x)). In particular, this means that for all w 0 = 2 W, we must have w 0 j =:P(n ). Thus, there must be some w 2 W such that wj =P(n ). Clearly W; wj =:', so Wj =:B', as desired.
These lemmas show that nding a relatively natural extension of axiom A7 that would cover the counterexample is a subtle matter. Nor is there any guarantee that such an extension would give us a complete axiomatization. For example, notice that all the sound axioms we have considered so far are not only valid, but strongly valid. It may well be that there are formulas that are valid but not strongly valid. If so, we need to nd an axiom that is valid but not strongly valid. The formulas that we have considered in this paper do not have this property. We leave further exploration of these issues to future work.
